The programmable nodes verify the active Fig. Security solution. A malicious user would modify the authorization parameters. To avoid a user being able to modify the 2.
The authorization server generates the session key and authorization parameters, the session key will be generated by sends it to the user using 1. In general we can say that the end systems session key and HMAC.
Finally, the user sends the active source or destination , from which the user has requested the packet towards the destination. When a programmable node receives an active packet, if it system if necessary. Then, the programmable node generates the active packet from S to D, and from D to S , we must generate session key by using Kci and the authorization parameters the session key using the S and D ordered parameters; first, the that carry the active packet, and verifies the integrity and minor value and then the major value.
Therefore, we avoid the authentication of the active packet. The programmable use of two session keys, one for each direction. Anti-replay Protection of Active Packets 5. Once the active packet is processed, if it has been modified, the programmable node protects it by using the session key. The HMAC algorithm provides protection against integrity Finally, the programmable node sends the active packet and authentication attacks on the active packet. But an towards the destination. The programmable nodes process the injected carried out by the programmable node and consists of the active packet because the HMAC verification is right.
The parameters of S and D that correspond to the IP source active packet has already been processed by the same and IP destination respectively of the active packets are programmable node before processing it. IP networks, which consists of identifying every active packet 2. As an IP network does not active packet arrives at the programmable node within a guarantee the ordering of the packets, it is necessary to valid period of time.
The identifier of the programmable service Ci is used to windows. The sliding window will have a constant size and verify that the user does not request a different service to represents a range of sequence numbers. In a programmable network, the programmable nodes must 4.
The parameter U would be used by the programmable carry out the anti-replay verification every time a new active node to identify the user that requests the service, for packet is received. The mechanism used in IPSec is example, for charging purposes. The security proposals in the state of the art define a mechanism based on The programmable nodes can generate the session key, so implementing the IPsec anti-replay procedure between every they are authorized to generate new active packets on behalf of two neighboring programmable nodes [21].
The proposals that the user, or to modify incoming active packets. In Note that the transport of the authorization parameters to the addition, the users and programmable nodes need to know the programmable nodes is single and efficient in resource topology of the programmable network.
We will propose a consumption. In other proposals of the state of the art, the variation in the solution that avoids the need to know the authorization parameters are transported as a credential generated topology and that supports changes in topology.
The use of a digital signature requires the active packets new active packets into a flow of active packets from a source to transport a larger amount of information and requires too to a destination, and that the active packets would pass through much processing to verify the authenticity of the credential. If the destination needs to send different sources of active packets: the end system end source active packets towards the source, it uses the same session key and the programmable nodes intermediary sources.
If we use Bernardo Alarco et al. To provide both situations of inconsistency in the numeration would be created. This process requires security services of mutual To avoid this problem, we will use a different numeration for authentication and confidentiality for the session key.
To make every source end source and intermediates sources that this possible we can also use a TLS connection. In addition, we must take into account that a programmable network would have a 1. Source: IP address of the programmable node or end in terms of the requirement for processing by the authorization system that has generated the active packet.
Sequence number. So appending a field to carry used by the authorization server and the code servers to the IP address of the programmable node is necessary. They make a computation based on To implement this procedure, the programmable nodes that a hash function in order to be fast, even if the amount of receive the active packets must implement one sliding window programmable services Ci is high. The procedure is as for every source of active packets corresponding to the same follows: The authorization server and code servers use the seed session.
The MSj value depends on the seed, the period of sliding windows and carrying the IP address of the generator of validity of the keys generated VP , and the master secret the active packet we avoid the inconsistency of the number of generated in the last refreshment process MSj To avoid this problem, the every programmable service identified by Ci, and for the period programmable nodes save the higher bits of the sequence of refreshment j, as shown in 3.
Thus, the sequence number will start with a higher value than the last one used before the reboot. Code servers Refreshment request E. Others Security Processes Now we will briefly describe other less critical processes involved in the security solution. The programmable nodes download the Kci values and Response Authorization server programmable service codes from the code server. This procedure requires security services for mutual authentication Fig.
Kci refreshment. To avoid the consumed time to generate the programmable service, the domains will exchange a session messages depending on the amount of code servers, the key. This session key is used by the end system user and the protection of confidentiality applied to the seed will be carried programmable nodes to protect the active packets.
We propose out using symmetric cryptography, instead of asymmetric to use a unique multidomain session key Km in order to cryptography. For authentication purposes, we use a digital simplify the security processing in the programmable node. Now, we will explain the security solution in a multidomain When sending the response message, Response in Fig. The following phases will be code servers confirm that it has received the refreshment highlighted in the solution: properly.
This message must be protected by authentication and 1. The process of finding out which domains take part in a integrity procedures.
The response message would provoke a session of a programmable service. The negotiation process for the session with the response messages code servers is high. Thus, the encountered domains. The protection process for the active packets. The multidomain solution must fulfill the requirements on 2. Multidomain Security the topology. This means that the user and the programmable A. Introduction nodes do not need know the topology of the programmable network.
Furthermore, the solution must support changes in the The proposal of the security architecture inside an topology. These components are the programmable nodes does not increase when the active packets programmable nodes, the code servers, and the authorization cross various domains. Additionally, the amount of information server. The relationship between these components makes it related to the security, which is carried by the active packet, possible for them to share a secret.
In this case, the secret is the must be reasonable as the number of domains increases. But, it is not reasonable to extend this trust relationship must be on the edge of the network, so this technology will be out of a domain. This means that the Kci keys must not be offered usually by the ISPs that give direct service to the users. So, every Therefore, a multidomain session will generally imply two administrative domain j will have its own Kcij values for every domains, and in some extreme situations, could be up to four programmable service.
Therefore, the verification of the packet will fail. To resolve this problem, it is necessary to establish a dynamic security association between the different domains Intranet that take part in a session.
However, it is ISP possible to share a secret value that has the validity period of Transport the session: these are the dominion session keys Kj.
The first question that we must answer is which domains will be crossed by the active packets. The user must Programmable network negotiate with the service over these domains their Intranet authorization servers.
Therefore, we give the opportunity to all the domains to decide whether the user is authorized to receive the requested programmable service. Then, the first authorization server knows the IP address of the new one, B. Domain Discovery and can follow the negotiation process of the session.
To discover the programmable domains that participate in a The new authorization server initiates a repetition, made up session, we will use the programmable network technology of the four messages, request of discovery, scout, request of itself, sending an active packet called a scout from the source to identity, and notification of identity.
But in this case when it is the destination. The scout carries the IP address of the not the first AS the first message request of discovery is not authorization server AS that belongs to the domain from sent to S; instead, it is sent to the programmable node that had which it originated. When the scout reaches the first sent him the request of identity in the previous iteration. After programmable node of a new domain, this programmable node the repetition, every authorization server will know the IP will inform its AS of the IP address of the previous AS.
Then, a address of the next authorization server in the path from S to D. So, at the end of this belongs to its domain, it will finish the search process. If the process every authorization server will know the previous domain of the destination does not have the programmable authorization server along the path of the active packets.
When network technology, then the authorization server of the last an AS knows its nearby AS, it will negotiate with it. In this case, the previous authorization discovery and negotiation phases applied to a scenario with server will continue the search process.
When the scout C. Multidomain Session Negotiation packet reaches a programmable node of a new domain, the Once an authorization server receives a notification of programmable node detects that the IP address of the identity message from the next server, it sends the server a authorization server, which carries the scout packet, does not request of session message, as shown in Fig.
So, this correspond to its authorization server. The authorization servers would change message to its authorization server, indicating the IP address the authorization parameters in this process.
For example, an and the IP address of the previous authorization server. The authorization server would reduce the SET parameter to reduce the service time if the requested time is higher than the one supported by its domain. These values are sent back to the source S.
The session key Kj for the domain j is generated using 5. This value is sent on to the next authorization server, where Kcij Response is the assigned key in the domain j to the programmable K3 service identified by Ci. The interdomain session key Kij generated by the authorization server of the domain j is a Fig.
Discovering and negotiation. The When a programmable node receives an active packet, it will interdomain session keys Kij are public values, so they do generate the session key Kd of its domain d. Then, the not need confidentiality. These values are sent up to the programmable node uses this session key Kd and the source.
When a programmable node of domain 2 nearest S receives the response message, it can generate the receives an active packet, it generates the session key of its multidomain session key Km using the session keys of all the domain using 8. Km using Here, the procedure only changes to generate the multidomain D. Active Packet Processing session key Km , which is a bit more complex but does not require many more resources for the programmable nodes. The source S sends active packets to the destination D Finally, we must say that all the messages in the phase of protected as we have explained in a domain scenario, but using discovering and session negotiation are protected using the multidomain session key Km instead the session key of its authentications and anti-replay mechanisms.
Furthermore, domain Kj. The implementation has been carried out confidentiality service on the programmable networks platform called Simple Active Bernardo Alarco et al. The SARA If the number of domains is 1, 2, 3, or 4, the processing time implementation is carried out mainly in Java language. So the is 1. So the security implementation has been carried out in Java. This programmable node when an active packet is received.
We is because the multidomain solution only introduces changes have measured the cost of the different procedures carried out into the session key generation procedure, which is a procedure by the programmable node on an active packet. We have used a single programmable service called The measurements have been carried out assuming that the NameTrace that copies the node IP address in the active packet.
Only the The destination forwards the active packet toward the source. The download time is great address of all the programmable nodes in the path. Because the compared to the processing time, but its influence on the process programmable nodes must modify the active packet, they must throughout the life of the programmable service will be reduced. We can see we can see the overload for different packet sizes, and for a that the time needed to process an active packet is divided into different number of domains between 1 and 4 shown in Fig.
In an extreme case of four programmable node. We have seen that for one domain, the total processing time We have compared the solution proposal in this article with a of an active packet was 1. If the active packet carries a digital signature, in addition The rest of the programmable node will increase.
We have measured the cost of time The time needed to reduced even using a single programmable service. If we use a verify the digital signature was 1. Thus, if we use a digital signature, the delay in the security process increases from 0, 1. In addition, if we transport the digital signature in 1 the active packet, the overload in the security information will be increased. In the case of a domain and for a packet size of 0.
Therefore, we 0. Time needed to process an active packet. Overload of the security information. These particular problems use a digital signature. We have estimated the time that a user must wait for a The tests carried out demonstrate that the security proposal response when requesting a service.
The estimations have been presented in this article is scalable according to the number of carried out by measuring the time needed for the cryptographic domains, and is more efficient than the more representative procedures and the delay in the messages in a real scenario.
In ideas presented in the state of the art. This is a reasonable time because the procedure is carried out before starting the service. Wetherall, U. Legedza, and J. We on Active and Programmable Networks, vol. A better improvement [2] D. Tennenhouse, J. Smith, W. Sincoskie, D. Wetherall, may be to create a cryptographic provider based on C language, and G. Magazine, Jan. Java native interface. Moore and Scott M. In this article, we have presented a security proposal applied [4] J.
Biswas, A. Lazar, S. Mahjoub, L. Pau, M. Suzuki, S. Wang, and S. Magazine, Special Issue on Programmable Networks, real network. One contribution in this sense consists of a Oct. Adam, Aurel A. Lazar, and Mahesan Nandikesan, needing to know the topology. ISE Conf. Furthermore, we have presented an original procedure Programmable Network and Management Architecture—Draft, to regenerate a multidomain session key in the programmable Fain Project Deliverable, May We have proposed an anti-replay protection of active packets [13] D.
Scott Alexander, W. Arbaugh, A. Keromytis, and J. He received the Faber, B. Braden, B. Lindell, S. Berson, and K. Murphy, E. Lewis, R. Puga, R. Watson, and R. There are many types of network securities and some of them are as follows:. Thus, everyone must have the knowledge of protecting tools because the people can at least protect their own network from all suck attacks. If you want to secure the present threat environment, there is a need to provide more than just basic network security.
It needs to equip with technologies like deep learning, AI, etc. It will make sure the upcoming threats get tackled adequately. Content of the Seminar and pdf report for Network Security. All you need to do is just click on the download link and get it. Network Security pdf Report Free Download. If you liked it then please share it or if you want to ask anything then please hit comment button.
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